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ABSTRACT
~e Soviet Union has Q e of Lhe most 'mportant elements 01 ea-
power at its disposal--a very effective merchant marine. The ev-
elopment of this instrum nt has not been witlout its attendan dif-
ficultie 0 W en the ~oViet arne to power in 1911 th € as little
left upon which to buildo '!hey ther~ore set about to a1vage ha t
they could and topand at a very moderate pace. 'here were many
other programs which demanded the tline and the rrJourses of the
USSR. Eventually, however, a large nwnbsr of these conflicts were
resolved and the leaders of the Communist Party bega' n to give Lhe
attention to the merchant fleet that it deserved o
l'he cOTn..'llercial fleet. of the Soviet nion serves several purpo.3es •
. t i an _ onomic tool use to conserve c se har currency and
even to earn it. he merchant marine has been a viaule political
tool. I t has ca.rried the influence nct the doc t .ine 01' the USS
to many countries of the ,arId. This has not been a. recent use, but
was one as far back as 1936 d iog . e ~panish C'vi1 ~~ro Merchant
shipping also supports the Russ'an Navyo
'l),is paper trAces the development of the R ssian r erchant Marine
under the oviet regime, an it (usc~sses why and how tJis leet
has become one of he world1s foremost seagoing in3tituti~nso
ii
The Development of the Soviet Merchant Marine
PART I. INTRODUCTION
It should be no surprise that the Russian Sear bas
learned to swim. Unquestionably the Soviet Navy today is a
modern, technically well trained, and dedicated force.
Furthermore, the merehant marine is rated high on the list
of Soviet instruments for the projection of influence
whether political or economic.
Russia has had a long but quite intermittent maritime
history. Since the founding of Russia at KIEV in 882 A.D.
Russian seapower has experienced a series of peaks and
valleys in its fortunes. Russian maritime interests have
influenced 'world trade, territorial expansion, exploration
and research. l:J.p,' ntil the present, however, few Russian
achievements at sea could match the more traditionally ocean
oriented countries such as England or even the United
States. This is not to imply that the Russians have not
been innovative or lacking in contributions to the maritime
history of the world. The Russians have been prominent in
both military invention and scientific research. Their
efforts extend from Krusenstern's circumnavigation of the
world to the first use of explosive shells by ship against
ship at the battle of Sinope in 1853. 1
In spite of the efforts of several autocratic rulers to
obtain maritime recognition, Russia historically has been a
"land" power whose interest lay mainly along the lengthy
land frontiers of the nation. In 1917 the Russian Revolu-
tion shook the world. The consequences have been enormous.
Sometime after 1917, the Russians began to look again
toward the sea, emerging onto the oceans as a significant
factor. All of thiE took place slowly at first, but after
World War 11 at an increasing rate. Why they did this and
how, is wortny of investigation. After all the USSR is
undeniably currently one of the world's greatest powers.
Considering the almost zero base from which the Soviets
started, their progress toward maritime prominence is
truly remarkable.
In his book, The Influence of Seapower Upon History,
1660-1783, A.T. Mahan enumerated six national characteristics
which historically have exerted either a positive or nega-
tive influence on a nation's development of seapower. These
are geographical position, physical conformation, extent of
territory, number of population, character of the people and
character of the government. 2 Using these as inputs to test
the proclivity of Russia to become a seapower, it appears
that geographical position, physical conformity and extent of
territory have all impended Russian development as a maritime
nation. In spite of a long coastline, there are few good
usuable harbors. Access to any open ocean area, except from
her far northern and most unhospitable parts is severely
2
restricted. The remaining three characteristics are more
susceptible to change by the Soviets. 1'he population is
large, but only a small percentage has in the past been en-
gaged in maritime pursuits. Becasue of the difficulties in-
volved in building their seaborne system, lack of incen-
tives to overcome these difficulties, and relatively better
developed system of inland communications, the people have
been inclined more away from than toward the sea. This is
no longer the case. Technology has made it easier. ECQ-
nomic and political incentives appeal to the Russian in-
stinct to go to sea. Finally, the character of the govern-
ment has been completely totalitarian under both Tsarist
and Communist regimes. This fact has so~etimes enabled a
seapower minded minority to influence the course of an
entire nation.
The Bolshevik Revolution destroyed many Tsarist insti-
tutions, among them an antiquated and useless merchant
marine which hgd last painfully proven its inadequacy in
failing to support the Imperial Navy during the Russo-
Japanese War. Following the Bolsnevik takeover, there was
a painful period of political consolidation and a fight
to the death with reactionary forces attempting to topple
the Communist government. It was virtually impossible
for the Soviets to instantaneously gain control of all
Russian assets and resources.
3
Reliable figures estimating the size of the Russian
merchant marine at the time of th~ Romanov overthrow are
difficult to obtain. The London Times estimated that in
early 1918, the Bolsheviks were striving to gain control of
one million tons of former Czarist shipping. 3 Another
source listed the composition of the Soviet merchant marine
exclusive of any Caspian sea shipping as 788 steamers of all
types and 3068 assorted sailing vessels. Steam tonnage
totalled about one million gross tons.
Judging from the chaotic nature of the pOltical, social,
military and economic conditions, the size and condition.
of the merchant marine was irrelevant. Much of the shipping
was scattered throughout various Russian ports, many of
which were not yet under Bolshevik control. Ef£orts were
made to limit the number of ships which would fall to the
Communist if they were victorious~ At Vladivostok a U.S.
naval officer was reportedly purchasing all available
Russian shipping in order to keep it from falling into
Communist hands. 4 A number of Russian ships in foreign
ports were also beyond the reach of the revolutionaries.
Quite naturally it was the policy of the Bolsheviks to
oppose any attempts by reactionary forces to dispose of
Russian shipping which they might at the moment control.
The Soviet Foreign Minister protested the sale of Russian
. I
ships to Greece, Romania, ana Jugoslavia by General Wrangel.
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In a message to major governments, the Soviets stated that,
"We are compelled to call your attention to this state of
things against which we protest with the greatest energy,
demanding that urgent measures for preventing waste of the
patrimony of the Russian people and assuring restoration of
its merchant fleet taken with the least delay."S As a
follow-on to this the Soviet Foreign Minister notified
concerned foreign governments that all Russian merchant
ships in foreign ports belonged to the Soviet government and
could not be chartered or change hands without its consent.
The Soviet government considered all eontracts made by
former shipping directors as illegal and theft of state
property. 6
As a semblance of normalcy began to descend on Russia
and foreign trade prospects revived, the Soviets intensified
their efforts to retain or regain merchant shipping which
had belonged to Russia under the Czars. The United States
and Great Britain were requested to use their influence to
prevent delivery of ships sold by the Markoff government at
Vladivostok to the Japanese. 7 Foreign trade was very
important to the young Bolshevik government in relieving the
isolation into which much of the world plunged it. Con-
$equently, in the early 1920's the Soviets were busy col-
lecting and repairing available ships in anticipation of a
resumption of trade. 8
5
PART II. THE BEGINNING 1920-1930
The merchant marine of the USSR did not spring into
being. It came to life slowly, with relatively little
attention, limited resources, and major material and per-
sonnel problems. What more could be expected in a country
which had not only just lost a foreign war, but which had
also been shattered by an internal political upheaval re·-
suIting in a bloody, destructive civil war lasting several
years?
The first formal step in creating a merchant marine was
taken by the Soviet government through a nationalization
decree of 23 January 1918. It stated in part that "All
shipping firms owned by companies limited by shares, co-
operatives, trading firms and individually owned large
enterprises, which own sea going vessels and river ships of
any kind, serving the purpose of carrying goods or pas-
sengers • • . « were national property of the Soviet Re-
public. Certain specific exceptions to th~s policy based
primarily on size and use were made, but. in general all
ocean going commercial ships were nationalized by this
decree. 9
It is quite difficult to determine the base from which
the S0viets began. Not only is it uncertain how much ton-
nage was actually ocean going, how much was steam and how
much sail, it is also hard to estimate just what condition
6
the ships were in. On 1 March 1921, an official Russian
newspaper reported that out of 732 steamers under Soviet
control only 566 were seaworthy.lO
During the first years of the 1920's the Communist
struggle for stability and legitimacy overshadowed a number
of programs, among which was merchant shipping. The largest
shipbuilding yard on the Black Sea was closed due to a
shortage of funds and merchant shipping was in the doldrums,
unable as yet to emerge as a viable Soviet enterprise. l1
For example between January and November 1922 only 50,000
tons of Russian shipping entered British ports as compared
to 1,600,000 tons of German shipping. 12 In 1923, however,
the Russians undert00k an effort to join foreign lines in
passenger trade. An agreement was signed with several
western steamship companies involving passenger trade to and
from the USSR. The "company" which formed had equally
divided control and equally shared profits. Although it was
capitalized solely for passenger trade, provisions were made
for its expansion to cover freight at a later date. This
was a beginning. 13
By mid-1924 several clear-cut objectives of merchant
marine development had crystalized in Soviet thinking. The
country was in economic trouble. A revival of industry and
trade was one of the steps deemed necessary for recovery and
the merchant marine was an essential element of foreign
7
trade operations. On 10 July 1924, at a public meeting in
Moscow, Leon Trotsky, who was at ehat time Minister of War,
and other Soviet officials urged that the USSR build an
effective merchant navy in order to take care of Russian
export trade, avoid overdependence on foreign shipping,
secure more favorable freight rates and strengthen the
Soviet navy during war time. Trotsky said:
My desi~e to see Russia build up her own
tonnage is prompted by the existence of a monopoly
in foreign trade which this nation holds. As this
monopoly is one of the bulwarks of the Soviet State,
I am sure the Government will not depart from its
avowed policy of controlling the country's overseas
trade(.14
In typical fashion Trotsky went on to emphasize the importance
of a merchant marine to the navy in war time. Because of
Trotsky's standing in the Communist Party and his position
as Minister of War, his statement represents the official
Soviet government position.
By 1924, the Soviets had formed a special commission to
study the merchantile marine problem. This commission
concluded that Russia had only 8.5 percent of the shipping
which the country needed. 15
Until 1924 there were no new shipbuilding starts under
the Bolshevik regime. Then six ships of 19',500 DWT total
were laid down in Russian shipyards followed by 7 more in
1925-26 and 13 more in 1926-25. By 1928, Russian shipyards
had been reorganized to a total capacity of 30,000 DWT. As
8
of 1 January 1929, at least 50,000,000 rubles had been
invested in the Soviet shipping industry.16
rIhe first formal Soviet merchant shipping code was
adopted in 1929. This law as awended would serve as the
code until 1968. Private ownership was strictly limited.
The code clearly ennunciated Soviet policy that merchant
ships were state property. 'The importance of this policy
lies in the fact that since by the act of nationali~ation,
the Soviet Union acquired Iltrue o .....nership" , the Russians
considered their merchant ships to be immune frOIT, legal
at.tachment. or seizure, property of sovereign state. 17as a
The merchant shipping code of 1929 recognized the merchant
fleet as an institution. Under its terms goods could be
carried Ilbetween USSR and foreign ports" and vice versa by
ships sailing under the flag of the USSR, and subject to
reciprosity, by ships sailing under foreign flag. As could
be expected, subject to waiver by competent authority,
coastal trade between USSR ports was required to be carried
in Soviet bott.oms. 18 This was not an unusual requirement.
The Tsarist government in the 1890's had prescribed that
trade between Black Sea and Baltic Sea, and either sea and
Siberian ports be carried by Russian flag ships.19
PART III. TRANSITION, 1930-1950
In the 1930's the Russians continued to expand and
modernize their commercial shipping. Shipbuilding was
9
included in Soviet economic planning as one element of their
Five Year Plans. The 1928-33 plan called by 24 ship starts
of 64,970 DWT. 20
The efforts of the Soviets to enter the world shipping
arena was cause for concern among the more well established
shipping countries. Being a State owned monopoly, the
Russian merchant marine could and did engage in rate manip-
ulation to gain advantages. A meeting of the Board of
Directors of the Baltic International Maritime Conference
held in BrusseLs vocally denounced what was considered
unethical Russian practices and strongly criticized the
Russians for their 1931 charter terms. The Board of Directors
of ~he conference went on record as strongly opposing plans
by various governments to sell new and used ships less than
five years old to the Russians. The world was in a period
of deep depression in which international shipping was
suffering as much as any other sector of the economy. Ship
owners and operators could hardly be expected to welcome
another competitor to an already underutilized field. 21
In spite of any opposition from foreign companies the
Soviets, having perceived that an increase in the carryin~
capacity of their merchant fleet was in the best interest
of the USSR, went ahead with a sizeable ship acquisition
program. From 1930 to late 1935, the Communist merchant
10
marine more than doubled in size. In 1930 it consisted of
532,096 gross tons; by late 1935 it ha~ reached 1,113,781
gross tons. 22 This increase in tonnage included both new
and used ships; ships built in the USSR and also abroad. In
1930, the Italians had contracted to build several Soviet
ships in Italian yards while training Russian engineers on
the job. 23 In 1933 Soviet yards had 13 motor cargo ships
under construction. 24 In 1935 alone, the Soviets purchased
70 steamships (350,000 tons total) abroad. Most of these
ships were bought from Holland and Germany for use in
Baltic and the Black Sea. 25
The increase in merchant marine was undoubtedly part of
a carefully considered policy which was being controlled by
the economic situation. In 1932 Soviet exports suffered a
30 percent decline of the 1931 level. Russia needed foreign
currency. Outside of Russia the ruble cop1d be purchased at
PD lit V\tt
the rate of six rubles per British shilling. The official
Red government rate never reached six per British pound. 26
One way of either obtaining or at least retaining available
hard currency was to carry as much of the existing trade as
possible in Soviet ships. In 1935, the Narodny Bank of
Moscow in a monthy review observed that it was costly for
the Soviets to have to charter foreign shipping and that
with the expansion of USSR tonnage this outflow of foreign
exhange was decreasing. In 1931 this had amounted to
11
9,623,000 pounds but by 1934 was reduced to 5,589,000. The
review also noted that extensive measures to further reduce
this outflow by better use of existing tonnage were under
consideration. 27 Whether or not vast increases in Soviet
imports/exports carried by Russian ships were counter-produc-
tive at this time is uncertain. In the case of Great Britain,
the London Times remarked that ". a desire greatly to
enlarge the share of the transport to this country would be
likely to react unfavorably Dn the purchases of Soviet
commodities, since the more that Soviet tonnage is employed
the less are freight earnings of British shipping to help to
reduce the discrepancy between the values of imports to
Great Britain of Russian products and the exports of 8ritish
goods to Russia. u28
Economic pressures continued to spur the Soviets to
develop their own shipping capability to a greater extent
while at the same time during this period commercial ship-
ping was competing with other programs for scarce resources.
Taking advantage of favorable trade agreements, Soviet ships
carried Soviet goods wherever possible. In 1937, Russian
ships carried all USSR imports from Great Britain and half
af USSR exports to tnat country.29
By 1939 Soviet attention co their commercial ships
began to bear fruit. Their achievements were much less than
12
spectacular, but nevertheless not to be ignored. Almost 24
percent of their ships were less than 10 years old; 26
percent were 10-20 years old; 24 percent were 20-30 years;
and the remainder were over 30 years old. 30 By 1939 the
Soviets had the eleventh large~t merchant navy in the world
with a total of 1,597,900 DWT. 31
The merchant shipping of all belligerents was severely
taxed during World War II. As a major industrial power
immune from qttack, the United States became a linchpin
in the allied shipping effort. On the other hand the Rus-
sians suffered a major catostrophy from the German invasion.
Industries which could not be moved were devastated as the
Germans advanced. Those which survied were destroyed by
the Germans in retreat as the tide of the war turned in
1943-44. Soviet merchant shipping was totally inadequate to
the task of supplying the Russians with necessary war
material. Stalin's main objective was to defeat the Germans
using as much allied hip as possible. This aid included Lend
Lease shipping. Between July 1942 and May 1945, the Soviet
Union received 127 freighters and tankers from the United
States under this program. 32
Shortly after the end of World War II, there were 488
ships over 1000 GRT in the Soviet merchant navy. Eighty of
these belonged to the original group of 127 United States
Lend Lease ships mentioned above. 33 The immediate postwar
13
years saw little concrete activity toward merchant marine
growth. Although the Soviets announced a plan to double
their pre-war tonnage by 1950, there was little civilian
building in the USSR. Russian yards had been heavily damaged
or destroyed by the war. Before any significant ship con-
struction effort could be undertaken, these had to be rebuilt
or replaced. This the Soviets did largely with equipment
machinery, and per~onnel taken from Germany as spoils of
war. In 1945-46, three complete shipyards were taken from
Germany to the USSR. Three additional German yards were
partially removed to Russia. 34 There were two other reasons
for the slow pace of indigenous activity. As the ties of
alliance began to weaken with the West, Stalin opted to
build a Soviet Navy capable of representing the interest of
the Soviet Union using technology and expertise taken from
Germany. Consequently during the immediate post war period
naval construction had priority in Soviet yards. Another
reason is that the Russian received large numbers of German
and Italian ships as reparations including about one-third
of the German tonnage which had not been destroyed in the
war. The German ships were comprised of passenger liners
and 3000-7000 ton tramp and general freighter types. 35
The Russians were very clandestine during this period
about their shipping activities. This was quite in keeping
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with their manner of operating in all matters which could
come under foreign scrutiny. Information, always difficult
to obtain in a totalitarian state, was even more so in the
Soviet Union at this time. Although maritime nations
normally reported almost all ship movements to such inter-
national shipping services as Lloyd's, the Soviets con-
spicuously did not. The Western countries generally were
largely unaware of Russian merchant fleet operations.
Soviet ships would fEequently make several trips to Western
ports and then their movements would be totally obscure for
months or years until they turned up again at a Western port
or were reported by a neutral ship to have been seen in a
Communist port which the neutral visited. 36
During the 1946-1951 time frame the Russian merchant
marine can be considered as not to have been a real com-
petitor in the fieid. There was a world wide need for
shipping as trade revived and conditions returned to normal,
but the world did not need a maritime race between Russia
and the West. In the late 1940's and early 1950's there was
enough friction in foreign policy because of the Cold War.
In spite of opportunity, the Russians did not participate in
world shipping trade to any extent. There are indications
such as irregularity of service, slow speed of their ships,
age of the fleet (about 50 percent of the ships in 1949 were
over 30 years old) and neglect of commercial building in
15
deference to naval construction which point to an inef-
ficient and somewhat neglected merchant navy. Although they
had sixty ships of 7000 tons or over by the fall of 1950,
many of these were old and obsolescent, most having been
built between 1920 and 1930; some as early as 1909 and
1913. 37 In terms of tonnage the Russians were regressing.
In fact by the summer of 1950" they had 70,000 tons less
shipping than in 1946. 38
PART IV. PROGRESS 1950-1970
By 1950 the USSR was assuming an increasing signifi~­
ance in world affairs, becoming more and more bellicose, and
less and less trustworthy in the eyes of the former allies.
The Cold War was becoming hot in Korea and Western policy
to isolate the Soviet Union was in effect and singularly
ineffective.
Soviet economic planning has long been based on a
series of "plans" most of which were five year plans. These
documents were statements of economic policy which reflected
the emphasis and attention bestowed upon various elements of
the economic sector by the government of the USSR. It is
important to distinguish between intent and achievement when
discussing these documents. Nevertheless, their content is
significant.
16
In 1950/ the Russians promulgated a Five Year Plan for
1951-1955 which embodied some substantive statements o£
policy concerning maritime development.
The Fifth Five Year Plan (1951-1955) contained an
ambitious maritime program. The plan called for an increase
in launching of sea going freighters and tankers by ap-
proximately 2.9 tons in 1955 as compared to the 1950 level.
It al~o prescribed large increases in the river and fishing
fleets.
A study of the Fifth Five Year Plan leads one to
believe that by this time the Russians had been able to
develop the concept of a commercial fleet as a system com-
posed of the shipyards, the ships themselves, ports, the
shore cargo handling facilities and the inland transporta-
tion facilities. Also interesting are the goals which the
Soviets set for themselves in the plan. The objectives for
each subsystem as delineated in the plan were as follows:
- To considerably increase the total tonnage of
the merchant fleet.
- To increase the base of the shipbuilding indus-
try building seagoing ships by means af the construction of
new and by widening the existing shipbuilding and ship
repairing yards.
- To carry out the necessary work in widening and
17
reconstructing the Lenigrad, Odessa, Zhdanovsk, and other
Far Eastern seaports.
- To insure an increase in the capacity for hand-
ling ships by seagoing ports.
- To increase the capacity of ship repair yards
for seagoing vessels by approximately 100 per cent.
- To increase the capacity of fishing ports.
- To increase use of the Northern Sea Ports.
- To improve the work of the seagoing fleet.
To reduce the time the ships lie idle.
Perhaps it is significant at this point that the Soviets
have always put great reliance on the use of waterways,
canals and rivers for inland movement of goods brought from
the sea. In the 1951-55 plan they called for an increase in
all facets of river transportation and "the building of a
fleet of passenger and freight river vessels suitable for
operation along major water reservoirs." This plan adopted
by the Soviets called for doubling the capacity of river
ports and increasing efficiency of main ports by means of
mechanization.
Their consideration of inland distribution and their
port system is important since without adequacy of either the
effectiveness of the seagoing merchant marine is severly
curtailed. In a report of a seminar on shipping economics
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
18
stated that " . it is most relevant to look upon ports
as links in the transport chain, which consists of the
inland transport systems and the ocean transport industry
with ports as the point of transfer from one mode of trans-
port te another." UNCTAD went on to point out that "In many
cases, bottle-neck conditions in ports originate with under-
capacity in the inland transport system which s~rves the
port ... 39
Not only was the Russian government outwardly committed
to a maritime policy, it was in fact the firm program of
the real power--the communist party. In promulgating the
1951-55 Five Year Plan the 19th Congress of the CPSU did so
in a direct manner with the statement preceding the
enumeration of specific actions to be taken which said:
The successful fulfillment of the fourth
Five Year Plan makes it possible to adopt
another, the fifth Five Year Plan insuring
the further advanc of all branches of the
national economy, a rise in the material well-
being, health and cultural standard of the people.
In conformity with this, the Nineteenth
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union decress it necessary to give the Central
Committee of the Party and the Council of Min-
isters of the USSR the following directives for
the fifth Five Year Plan of the development of the
USSR for 1951-55.
Overall this fifth Five Year Plan called for an increase
in expeditures for transportation of 63 percent over the
1946-50 level. It did not establish budgetary critera for
19
ocean versus inland water transport, but it ~s apparent that
the Soviet Union did indeed recognize the importance of a
merchant fleet and its operation.
As previously mentioned while Stalin was alive, the
Russian shipyards were heavily engaged in naval construction
which included cruisers, destroyers and submarines. The
satellite countries became important ship suppliers to the
Soviets during this period. The second sea going ship de-
livered from a Polish yard following World War II was built
for the Russians. 40 Beginning about 1950 with the delivery
of new ships from yards outside RU$sia, a more modern com-
mercial fleet began to take form and as the naval ship-
building requirements were either met or changed, some
Soviet yards began civilian ship construction. Russian
yards produced 50 percent of the ships added to the fleet
between 1950-1955. Almost eight times as many ships were
added between 1950-1955 as has been added in the period
1945-1950. 41
Stalin's death probably marked a major milestone in the
development of the Soviet merchant marine. During the
Stalin period Russia had withdrawn more and more within its
own sphere of economic influence. Stalin believed that the
West would suffer greater loses by this isolation than would
20
the Communist Bloc. Upon his death, a reversal took place
in Russian policy and the Soviet Union under new leadership
began to expand trade and commenced an economic offensive
which required a merchant marine if it was to be effective.
Although, ocean tranpport had been considered an important
program as was demonstrated in the 1951-1955 Five Year Plan
d 1 " b '1 ' l' 42un er Sta ln, ~t now ecame vlta to Sovlet po lCy. At
the beginning of the post Stalin period trade was relatively
small and 81 per cent by value was conducted with other
Communist countries. This trade increased at a rapid pace
as the new Soviet leadership expanQed it's influence. Sea-
borne trade increased 220 percent between 1950 and 1958.
This volume of trade demanded an increasing number of Russian
h ' 43s lpS.
Between 1953 and 1958, there was a great upsurge in the
amount of Soviet tonnage. In 1953 the first of a series of
12,000 ton new tankers were delivered and new construction
was programmed at seven ships per year. These tankers built
in yards at Kherson and Leningrad were the first new ships
for the merchant fleet to be built in Russian shipyards
since World War 11. 44
As could be expected, this sudden change of emphasis
caused a stir in the Western World. A New York Times
article stated that "The Soviet Union's sudden preoccupation
with the acquisition of maritime equipment of all kinds has
21
aroused considerable speculation among Government officials."
The Soviets turned to many of the same sources for ships
which they had called upon in the past such as Poland and
Finland and other satellites. Belgium, Holland, Sweden, and
the Netherlands were also offered construction contracts.
The Soviets informed Great Britain that if the Free World
would relax restrictions on the type of goods which they
would ship to Russia, the Soviets would place orders for
almost two hundred merchant ships ranging in 5i2e mainly
from abou.t 3000 to 10,000 DWT. The New York Times went on
to say:
Diplomatic reports that Russia is bidding
for ships, from tankers, cargo vessels and whaling
ships to small smacks, can be accounted for in
only two ways as official observers see it.
1. The soviet Union has at last become sensitive
to United States demands for the return of about
eighty-six cargo (Liberty) ships that she obtained
on lend-lease during World War II.
2. Russia's trade expansion program calls for a
wide variety of sea going vessels. She seeks to
acquire ships of modern make before returning the
Liberty and other vessels on loan to her from
this country.45
Be5ide~ lack of shipping there were other short-comings
with the overall water transport system, both internal and
external. High level attention was focused on the problems.
In an article written for a Soviet shipping magazine in
1955, the Soviet Minister of Merchant Harine commented on
22
the inefficiency of ~ed shipping. He admitted that for
various re~sons, RUssian merchant ships were at sea only
about 40 percent of the time. It WaS essential that this
figure be increased to obtain efficient use of the shipping
assets. The Russians had taken a first step toward better
management in 1954 when they es~ablished a single ministry
for Marine Transportation instead of the previous two
ministries-one for merchant marine and one for river trans-
ports. 46
In 1956, the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union displayed considerable interest in
shipping improvement and an insight into how the situation
could be improved. In a speech to the Twentieth Congress,
L.M. Kaganovich stated that "The executives of the Merchant
Marine and River Fleet Ministries must demonstrate grea~er
activity and insistence in perfecting the reconstruction of
the fleet and introducing more power and better self-propelled
freight and passenger carrying vessels with higher speeds."
Acknowledging that shipping alone does not produce an ef-
ficient merchant marine, Kaganovich went on to say, "Port
and harbor installations are the most backward section of
water transport; they are even more out of date than the
vessels.,,47 Kaganovich also advocated greater use of the
Artie waterway to carry goods to the Far East instead of
transporting them over the prevailing long rail distances.
23
An important use of shipping as he viewed it was from Black
Sea ports to various other Soviet ports. 48
That the commercial fleet was a valuable instrument to
the Russian government in the 1956-1960 Five Year Plan was
acknowledged by N.A. Bulganin, Chairman of the USSR Counci~
of Ministers to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. In
BuLganin's words "The volume of seaborne freight is to be
more than double in the Five Year period. Development of
trade with CPR, Peoples Democracies, Republic of India,
Union of Burma and other countries will result in a larger
volume of export and import goods being carried in Soviet
ships." Bulganin then laid out the plan. "New and up~to-
date ships will be supplied to our merchant marine in large
numbers. It will receive in five years freight ships to a
total of 1.6 million tons or 80 pe~cent more than in the
Fifth Five Year period. We shall build new big motor ships,
tankers, timber carriers and other vessels. We must there-
fore pay more attention to develop our shipbuilding in-
dustry. 1I 49
In 1959 Russia announced a new Seven Year Plan for the
economy which was effective for the period 1959-1965. The
Soviet goal was to carry 90 percent of Soviet dry cargo in
their ships by 1965 and 93 percent of their oil in national
tankers. At the beginning of the program their fleet stood
in twelfth place among the commereial fleets of the world.
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The following table summarizes ship acquisitions under the
Seven Year Plan, 1959-1965.
TABLE 1
YEAR 'I'ONNAGE (M-DWT) %INC NUMBER OF SHIPS %INC
1959 4.6 0 858 0
1960 4.9 6.1 873 1.7
1961 5.3 12.2 895 2.5
19 162 5.9 11. 3 1,002 11. 9
1963 7.0 18.6 1,124. 12.1
1964 8.2 17.1 1,227 9.1
1965 9.6 7.3 1, 34 '5 9.6
SOURCE: U.S. MA.RITIME Administration
The 1959-65 plan was inaugurated at a time which was
highly fortuitous for the Soviet shipping enterprise. In
1958 Western nations had generally relaxed restrictions on
exports to the Soviet Union while shipbuilding in the West
was in an economic slump. This facilitated the addition of
a number of new types of ships to the Russian merchant
fleet. A new series of bulk dry cargo carriers, general
purpose cargo ships, and s~veral series of new tankers were
acquired. Domestic and Bloc yards also contributed to the
50growing tonnage.- The addition of the new ships had the
eff'ect. of not only increasing carrying capacity but also
extensively modernizing the fleet. In 1953, the two oldest
merchant fleets in the world were Spain and Russia. At that
time 53 percent of Soviet ships were more than 25 years
25
old. 5l By 1964 the profile of the fleet had changed
significantly. The following table compares the fleet of
the USSR with the world fleet as a whole.
TABLE 2
ALL TYPES
AGE
SPEED
DRAFT
SIZE
FREIGHTERS
AGE
SPEED
DRAFT
SIZE
TANKERS
AGE
SPEED
DRAFT
SIZE
SOVIET
15.5
11.9
21.4
5.9
19.5
11. 3
20.6
5.1
8.2
12.5
24.7
10.6
UNIT
YR.
KT.
FT.
DWT.
YR.
KT.
FT.
DWT.
YR.
KT.
FT.
DWT.
WORLD
13.6
13.1
25.2
lO~4
14.7
12.6
24.2
7.7
9.8
14.0
29.4
20.5
SOURCE: U.S. DEPARTMENT COMMERCE
In 1966, the Russians initiated another Five Year Plan
and merchant marine affairs were not neglected. This program
(1966-1970) called for a fifty percent increase in tonnage
and an 80 percent increase in cargo carried. The Minister of
Merchant Marine described the intentions of the Soviets to
add one million tons a year to their fleet for five years so
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that by 1970 they would possess about 15 million tons in-
eluding a large fishing fleet. Not only was quantity de-
sired but now quality as well. The USSR began to acquire
highly merchanized ships with up-to-date modern navigation
systems. 52 The Soviets clearly achieved their 1970 goals.
53Between 1966 and 1970, their fleet increased by 59 percent.
As of 1 July 1970, the Soviet merchant marine composition
was as follows: GRT/DWT 54
Total
Tonnage Tankers
Bulk
Cargo
General
Cargo Other Container
14,831,775
15,255,420
3,460,387 206,875
4,936,831 137,343
5,041,891 5,222,622 o
As in previous programs, this plan provided for in-
creasing and improving facilities at ports in conjunction
with more tonnage and in anticipation of greater throughputs
of cargo. A 17 percent increase in piers and jetties was
called for. Ports were scheduled to be equipped with highly
mechanized cargo handling gear. By doing this the Soviets
hoped to achieve a 40 percent increase in capacity. It was
under this plan that the extensive use of computers to
control snipping was inaugurated. 55
By 1970 the Russians could justifiably feel proud of
their remarkable progress. Their trade and influence was
expanding toward a peak and unquestionably the Soviet mer-
chant ship was a critical element in this endeavor.
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PART V. DEVELOPMENT 1970-75
For the past five years the Soviets have been Gonsol-
idating gains, reviewing their progress, and improving their
merchant marine. By 1970, Soviet shipping was world-wide,
calling at 939 ports. Soviet ships at this time serviced 33
foreign cargo lines. By 1971 the Russians had begun to plan
for containerization, setting up special handling equipment
. . t 561n varlOUS por s.
Since 1970, the Soviets have been making progress in
eliminating two previous deficiences in their. shipping--
container ships and large tankers. In January 1972, the
Soviet Union announced the launching of its first container
ship. This class of ship has a total capacity of 7000 tons,
speed of 15 knots, and due to automation requires a crew of
only 30 men. 57
By 1971, eighty percent of all Russian merchant ships
were less than 10 years old. This young fleet numbered
2,140 ships and over 15 million tons by 1975. A goal of 20
million DWT has been set for 1980 by the Russians. 58
Expansion of the Soviet merchant fleet in the 70's
continues to bring prophecies of ruin for western
countries from non-communist shipping sources while at the
same time Russian ships began regular service to countries
which had not seen them on other than an intermittent basis
since World War II. In the sun light of detente it has
28
become increasing difficult for vested interest to continue
to portray the merchant marine as a sinister ins.trument of
international communism even if it might be.
PART V. ECONOMIC MOTIVES
Whatever the main driving force behind the establish-
ment, development and growth of the Soviet merchant marine,
it would be hard to deny that much as in any country who is
engaged in foreign trade, economics playa large role. The
statements of TROTSKY on the need for a merchant marine have
already been discussed. These statements were made during
very difficult economic times for the Soviets. The party
recognized that some relaxation of the application of Marxist
economic doctrine would be necessary initially. The consequence
was Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP). The Russians could
ill afford to become any more dependent on foreign activities
than absolutely necessary. Looked upon as an outla~ govern-
ment by some and not recognized by one of tbe major world
powers, the United States, the Communist government needed
an indigenous merchant marine to reduce the outlaw of cur-
rency which resulted if foreign shipping was chartered to
carry' Russian car90. Furthermore, ocean transport could be
a valuable adjunct to the rail and river transport. In
spite of these factors it not true that the Russian merchant
marine became vital nor experienced phenomenal expansion or
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had unusal government support prior to World War II. Other
factors were influencing the Soviets which reduced pressure
eo build a commercial fleet. Ton ou~put of the shipping
industry actually did not exceed pre-revolution figures
prior to World War II. Figure 3 illustrates this.
FIGURE 3
MILLION TONS OF CARGO
1913
15
1928
8
1938
10
1945
20
1960
76
SOURCE; SOVIET MINISTRY OF MERCHANT MARINE
Shortly before World War II, most Soviet export and
import shipments were by sea. In 1938 export/import ship-
ments totalled 10.7 million gross tons of which 10,027,000
59tons were by sea. By 1950 the Soviets were able to carry
SO percent of Russian foreign trade in national bottoms.
However, during this period trade was expanding faster than
the fleet. Consequently by 1955, Russian ships were carry-
ing only 30 percent of Soviet trade. This cost the Soviets
money at a time when it was imperative that foreign currency
outflow be held to a minimum. The Soviets have been striving
to increase the amount of cargo carried by indigenous ship-
ping. In 1965 Victor Bakayev, Minister of Merchant Marine,
discussed some of the main objectives in developing a large
efficient commercial fleet. He said that the Soviet Union
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"is striving to have its own ships transport the greater
part of the goods bought and sold on terms stipulating the
use of its own means of transport." He went on to say that
"We declare that the basic task of the Soviet merchant
marine during the next years is to insure shipments of its
own goods bought and sold on condition that they are trans-
ported by our own means of conveyance. This is the main
task.,,60
Since 1955 total world seaborne trade has shown an
increase every year except 1958 when there was a minor 1
percent decrease. The average increase has been approxi-
mately 8 percent a year. 61 The Soviets will no doubt take
advantage of this increase. This increase in world trade
provides another incentive to develop a large capable mer-
chant fleet. It not only can conserve scarce hard currency
for the Soviets, but such a fleet can be used to earn it.
Fully cognizant that for political or other economic reasons,
not &11 Soviet seaborne trade can be carried in Soviet bottoms,
even if available, the Russians intend to charter enough of
their own shipping to carry third country goods to make up
any deficit. Under the 1966-70 Five Year Plan, the Minister
of Merchant Marine was directed to increase the foreign
charter of Soviet ships by a cargo volume carried factor of
lOO to 150 percent by 1970. The purpose of this W&s to
assist in attaining the Soviet goal of being able to cover
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in full qll Russian hard currency outlay for chartering
foreign ships.62
Victor Bakayev has carefully spelled out Soviet maritime
shipping policy in his book Soviet Ships on World Sea
Routes. He is quoted in Fairhall's, Russian Seapower as
having said:
The maritime policy of the USSR stems from
the task of extensive participation by the cargo
fleet in the economic competition between the
socialist and capitalist systems, of fully satis-
fying the demands of the economy and its external
trade, of fulfilling the country's own transport
needs at home and abroad, and increasing the
Soviet fleets share of international sea trans-
port. 63
It is apparent that the Russians see their entrance
into the ship charter market as a major goal. A particu-
larly attractive plan to do this is in developing nations.
Most of these countries have small or no commercial fleet at
all. Most are at best totally inadequate to carry sizeable
trade. The Russians want to be the primary carrier between
ports of the Third World and the Soviet Union. They are also
ready, willing, and able to make ships available for charter
to carry grain, coal, ore, petroleum, sugar, and other com-
modities to European ports. 64 The Soviets are absolutely
committed to acquiring a larger share of shipping trade of
the world.
Besides a need to earn hard currency the Soviets have
two other economically sound reasons for entering cross
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trades. Since 1960 exports from the Soviet UnLon have
exceeded imports by a considerable amount. In 1967 the
excess was over 8 B million tons. 'I'his figure indicates that
a substantial amount of tonnage may be returning to the USSR
, b 11 . I ,65lna ast--an uneconomlca operatlon.
The weather is also another factor making Soviet ship-
ping available to enter the international competition.
Since much of Russia is ice bound at least part of the year,
some merchant ships are idled unless they can be used else-
where.
Russian interest in acquiring an increased share of the
world1s shipping revenue has led them to resort to practices
Which frighten Western shipping lines and make them suspi-
cious of Russian motives. The Soviets are not averse to
"rate cutting" to get business and have done so in several
instances. For example a Soviet steamship company attempted
to enter regular service from Japan to the United States in
1970. Soviet freight rates for this run were 13 percent
less than existing rates. 66
Soviet seaborne trade has increased threefold in terms
of cargo tonnage since 1959. Without a large efficient
merchant marine, the Soviets would be compelled to spend a
considerable amount of their hard currency (or sell gold) to
charter foreign ships to handle their expanding trade. From
the Russian point of view this condition is totally unacceptable.
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On the contrary they believe it essential to have a large
increase in the percentage of USSR frieght carried in
Russian bottoms. The current Minister of Merchant Marine of
the USSR estimates that the cargo carried by Soviet ships in
1975 will represent a 40 percent increase over 1973. This
does not mean that the Russians will not charter foreign
ships when it is economically advantageous. They realize
that in some instances it is better to hire a foreign car-
rier than to send a Russian ship in ballast to pick-up
commodities. 67
A significant amount of Soviet trade is with the
satellite group of Eastern Europe, ideological allies and
non-alligned Third World countries. Trade with lesse~
developed countries has provided an opportunity for the
Soviet merchant marine to exhibit its worth. Many of the
countries with which the USSR trades have little or no
viable cargo carrying capability, a lack which is compen-
sated for by the Soviet merchant marine an it carries Soviet
goods to various ports. For instance the Soviets did al~ost
$80 million worth of export trade with Ceylon in 1964-66.
Ceylon's merchant marine totals only 10,000 tons. During
the same period Russia exported about $50 million worth of
material to Syria which has a merchant fleet of about 1000
tons. 68 These are only two ~xamples; there are more.
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soviet trade with the West is a substantial and an
increasingly important factor in merchant marine develop-
ment. The Russians have bilaterial shipping agreements with
France, Britain, Holland, Italy, Belguirn, the United States,
Sweden and others. The Soviets operate on over fifty inter-
national shipping lines. Its passenger trade exceeds 40
million people annually. Its routes include a Leningrad to
New York run and a New York to the Carribean vacation cruise
market. 69
As the Soviets view the situation there are several
very significant economic advantages to their expanding
merhcant marine. They can be summarized as follows:
1. It earns hard currency for the Soviet economy.
2. It reduces the outflow of hard currency.
3. Reduces Soviet dependence upon other country
shipping. As Bakayev pointed out prior to expansion "Soviet
foreign trade became increasingly dependent upon the world
capitalist fleet and the uncertainties of the capitalist
freight rnarket.,,70
4. Allows Soviets to have beneficial trade with
countries which are otherwise unaccessible.
5. Permits Soviets to influence World level of
maritime freight rates.
35
PART VI. POLITICAL-MILITARY USES OF THE MERCHANT MARINE
The Soviet Union is opportunistic. Just like most
major powers, i~ takes advantage of each chance to enhance
its power and prestige. The merchant marine has been of
substantial v~lue to the Russians in advancing their politico-
military objectives. Some people believe that expansion of
Soviet political influence is indeed one of the primary
functions of the ,fleet. According to a congressional report
II ••• the current Soviet campaign to extend the power and
reach of its merchant fleet impresses most informed observes
as having little in common with the normal course of develop-
ment of national shipping facilities generated in response
to specific domestic economic needs. The main stimulus in
the USSR is generally recognized as arising £rom the politi-
cal urge to increase the effectiveness of Communist world
diplomacy."7l
In view of the recent and emotional issues involved in
Viet Nam, it is easy to forget that the Soviets have been
supporting foreign Communist movements for years. Nor by
the very nature of the Russian government is this support
diluted by dissent from the Soviet people. The leaders of
the USSR have used the vast resources of the country to
further the international spread of Communism. As shown by
the record of their performance during the past four decades,
the main objective of the policies of Soviet rulers has not
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been promotion of the general welfare of the citizen but the
expansion of the perimeter of world cornmunism.,,72
One of the earliest efforts of the Soviets to support a
Communist movement which required the services of a merchant
fleet was during the Spanish Civil War in 1936-38. Soviet
merchant vessels were used to run the international blockade
to deliver arms, food, and other contraband material to
Republican Spain. This was just part of a program to shore
up the failing socialist oriented Spanish government. Not
all of the blockade runners were successful and several
crews were captured and interned for the duration of the war
in Spain.
Its involvement in Spain shows that the Soviet merchant
marine has served its government well even before the cur-
rent maritime expansion of the Soviet Union. Although the
Russians supported Republican Spain, Stalin was in no posi-
tion to openly challenge the support which Germany and Italy
provided the Nationalists. The merchant marine was a means
of influencing the outcome without becoming directly mili ....
tarily involved. However, the Soviets stood more to a gain
than simply Spanish Republican gratitude. They shipped
supplies in, but they also shipped Spanish gold reserves
73
out.
In 1950, the Soviets once again found themselves
supporting a country engaged in a civil war. Unwilling to
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become directly involved on a military basis, the Soviets
left the actual combat to the North Koreans and the Chinese.
North Korea could be supported overland from a friendly
China unlike the isolation of Spain in 1936. Nevertheless
Soviet ships continued to carry supplies to North Korea
during the war. Perhaps the most ironic note of all is that
the Russians used United States Liberty ships provided to
them as Lend Lease during World War II and not returned, to
carry much of the material that flowed from the USSR to
North Korea. A Greek merchant ship visiting Chinampo, North
Korea in May 1950, shortly before the war commenced reported
that several World War II Liberty ships in the harbor there
were flying the Russian flag. 74
After the death of Stalin the Soviet leadership began
an expansion of activities aimed at confronting the Western
world. As already mentioned trade was one facet of this
offensive. Taking a lesson from their bourgeois opponents,
the United States, the Soviets embarked upon a program of
military and economic aid to friendly and non-alligned Third
World countries. Military aid to countries non-contiguous
to the USSR began in 1955 when the Soviets supplied arms to
Egypt. Coupled with this was economic and technical as-
sistance. Since that time the Soviet Union has provided
about $8 billiQn in economic aid, small in comparision to
overall US aid, but nevertheless important in terms of what
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countries received it. Major recipients have been the UAR,
India, Indonesia, Iran, plus fifteen countries in Africa
and four in South America. Much of this aid has been used
to pay for an ever increasing spiral of Soviet imports by
the countries concerned. According to Soviet sources,
exports to Third World countries by the Soviet Union in-
creased by a factor of nine between 1955 and 1967. 75
Figure 4 shows the distribution of Soviet aid.
FIGURE 4 (MILLIONS $)
AFRICA ASIA LATIN AM. MIDDLE EAST
YEARS Aj40UNT % AMOUN'1' % AMOUNT % AMOUNT %
1954-1964 760 19 1,814 45 30 1 1,429 35
1965-1972 492 11 1,365 32 518 12 1,921 45
1954-1972 1,252 15 3,179 -38 548 7 3,350 50
SOURCE: James Theberge, The Soviet Presence In Latin America,
(New York: Crane, 1974), p. 24.
The distribution of Soviet aid has been scattered world
wide. Recipients include many countries such as SR~ LANKA
(Ceylon), Ghana, Zambia, and Laos which have no sizeable
merchant marine. The Soviets fill the void with their own
transport.
Perhaps the most dramatic demonstration of the impor-
tance of maritime power in political-military terms can be
found in Soviet-Cuban relations. The Russians were not the
authors of this opportunity to establish themselves in the
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political domain of the United States, but when Castro of-
fered to take Russian aid, it was quickly offered. Soviet
shipments to Cuba quickly rose from zero to almost $300
million per year.
The following figure shows how Soviet Cuban trade has
fluctuated since 1960 until 1970.
FIGURE 5 (MILLION U.S. DOLLARS)
YEAR 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
SOVIET EXPORT
AND l'MPORT T.77 593 595 559 647 710 758 926 893 847 1149 803 679
BALANCE -29 -25 +131 +233 +77 +33 +192 +188 +343 +388 +126 +282 +339
% OVERALL
TRADE 1.6 5.1 4.5 3.9 4.2 4.4 4.5 5.1 4.5 3.9 4.7 3.1 3.2
SOURCE: James Theberge, The Soviet Presence in Latin America,
(New York: Crane, 1974), p. 22.
This was an enormous increase in trade/aid for a small
country thousands of miles away from the USSR. Since the
Cuban merchant marine was incapable of providing for Cuban
import/export trade, the USSR took practically all of the
"burden" upon its own shoulders. 'l'he requirement to main-
tain a flow of goods to and from Cuba inorder to support the
Castro regime resulted in a need for additional shipping.
Between 1960 and 1964 the average length of haul for Russian
ocean shipping increased over 500 miles. This increase can
la~gely be attributed to Cuba. 76
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The Soviet leadership unquestionably looked upon theix
Cuban venture as a means of establishing themselves at the
very doorstep of their principal opponent, the United States.
It was a chance for them to do the same things that u.s.
policy did in Europe and Asia, and the Communist took the
step which only a maritime nation could have taken when
Russia supported Cuba.
The Cuban economy was not self-sufficient. One of its
major deficiencies was adequate petroleum and by nationalizing
refineries, Castro insured that Western oil supplier would
boycott Cuba. The Soviet Union on the other hand possessed
more than adequate petroleum from which to supply Cuba. 'The
Black Sea area alone was a major center of Soviet production.
What the Soviets did not have in 1960 was sufficient tanker
tonnage to take the amount of petroleum ne,eded daily to Cuba.
Because of the extreme potential poltical (and military}
benefits which this situation possessed, the Soviets made the
decision to supply oil to Cuba using Soviet tankers augment-
ed as necessary by foreign charter vessels. (This was not a
novel procedure since in 1959 the Soviets had used 2.5 million
tons 77 ). An effort was made by some Western concerns to deny
the Soviets the use of Western tankers. However, the Russians
were willing and did pay premimum rates to obtain the tonnage
needed to meet Cuban demands for petroleum. 'Jlhe Soviets
paid premium rates from 3.4 percent to 29 percent at a total
premium cost of over $8 rnillion. 78
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There is continuing evidence that the Soviets are using
their merchant fleet to pursue politico-military objectives.
In the last few years the value of a "neutral" shipping has
been once more demonstrated as Soviet merchant ships made
regular runs to North Vietnam ports completely iromune to
interdiction. Russian aid to North Vietnam by sea even-
tually reached massive proportions'. From 47 ships in 1964
·to 433 ships in 1967, the Soviets relied upon ships to move
h .. f . 1 d b 79 .t e enormous quantltles 0 materla use y NVN. Durlng
the Vietnam War, at least twenty Soviet ships regularly
operated between North Vietnam and Vladivostok.
Spain, North Korea, Cuba, and North Vietnam are only
four of the most prominent examples of the use of merchant
shipping to achieve politico-military aims. There are other
less dramatic examples in which the commercial fleet has
been of considerable utility to the Soviet Union. India,
Indonesia, and others have seen the "hammer and sickle"
flying from merchant ships in their ports. Russian merchant
ships visit Third World co~ntries on ~ continuous basis.
'There is no question about the value of this llshow the flag"
approach. A smart, modern ship is visible evidence to the
developing countries of what can be achieved under the
Marxist system. The USSR Minister of Merchant Marine has
said that "In transporting foreign trade cargoes between
many countries of the world, Soviet seamen contribute to the
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expansion of the international ties of the USSR."80
It is quite apparent that the Soviet Union is cognizant
of the international character of a viable merchant service
and the potential influence it gives to Russia. In 1965,
the Minister of Merchant Marine made it very clear that the
USSR knows how to use its ships of trade for more than
simply economics.
Economic criterea, however, important as
they are, still do not reveal fully the signifi-
cance of the merchant fleet to the Soviet govern-
ment. During the course of the Seven-Year Plan
the merchant fleet of the USSR carried out a
series of responsible tasks for the Communist
Party and the Soviet government, which were not
only economic, but also political in character,
Paramount among these, it should be emphasized,
was the participation in the breaking of the
military-political and trade-economic blockade
of Cuba established by American imperialism. Sl
PART VII. THE NAVY AND THE MERCHANT MARINE
After more than two hundred years the Soviet Union has
a modern agressive, well equipped and well trained navy which
now has more sea experience than every before. Possibly
better technically trained now man for man than any navy in
the world, the Soviets seem to have retained at least one
major fault which would put them at a decided disadvantage
in a war at sea. They cannout make quick tactical decisions.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that as a visible power force
the Russian navy today holds a high place. The armament and
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engineering of its ships seem to equal or exceed comparable
equipment in Western navies. The most remarkable fact is
how quickly the Soviets attained this position. They have
come a long way from the time when Russia could not even
produce a reliable truck. All in all the Soviet navy is a
wo.rthy contestant for control of the sea.
There is a close association in the Soviet Union between
the Navy and the mefchant marine. This is not an accident
but a realization by the Soviets of the interdependence of
the two major elements of seapower. Since the Communist
Party directs the government in the form of the Council of
Ministers it is without undue difficulty that the work of
the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Merchant Marine
can be correlated. The present head of the Soviet Navy is
also a Deputy Minister of Defense and a member of the
Central Committee of Communist Party. Furthemore, the
Ministry of Shipbuilding is responsible for all ship con-
struction including naval, merchant, fishing, research, and
river fleet. 82
One ingredient of an effective fighting navy is a well
trained, motivated, body of expert seamen who are experienced
and confident at sea. The American Revolutionary Admiral,
John Paul Jones once served in the early Imperial Russian
navy. His advice to the Russians to obtain good seamen was
4:4
to "create a merchant trade." It is only with this kind of
reservoir of traditional sea farers can a nation fulfill
its needs on the sea in time of war as well as in time of
peace. It is just this that the Soviets have lacked until
now. The contemporary government recognizes that there must
be close cooperation between navy and merchant marine and
,that the commercial fleet serves as a reserve component of
the fighting fleet. A Soviet merchant marine journal in
1966 commented that "There are a great many former Army and
Navy men, officially assigned to the reserves, who now work
aboard the ships and in the maritime transportation organi-
zations and enterprises. 1183
The merchant marine is a prime training ground in
peacetime for seagoing personnel who will man the navy
during wartime. Concurrent with their hardware build-up,
the Soviets have established an extensive shore training
program. The head of the educational department of the USSR
Ministry of Merchant Marine stated in 1966 that the merchant
fleets educational facilities had produced 24,000 trained
captains, ship mechanics, radio operators and others.
Furthermore, vocational schools had also turned out 38,000
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seamen, repair personnel and port workers.
At sea training is not neglected. In 1969, a 2500 ton
motor ship was added to the Soviet merchant marine. The
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KOMPAS a refrigerated fish carrier, had space for 110
students and facilities for teaching navigation, co~~uni­
cations, and other related seamanship topics. 85
The merchant navy also serves as a source of intel-
ligence for the Soviet military. This is not an innovation
and was a standard Soviet practice in the 1930's. Each crew
aboard a Russian merchant ship had its group of "seamen-
specialist" who in reality were NKVD agents. Not only was
it their responsibility to report on members of the crew,
but they also maintained contact with other NKVD espionage
agents in various countries. 86
Since the ships of the Soviet merchant marine are state
property it would be naive to assume that they do not gather
intelligence and report back to a collecting agency. Found
world-wide, Russian shipping serves to keep the Soviet
government well informed on political and military matters
in ports which Russian ships visit.
A major function of the merchant marine is providing
direct support to Soviet naval operations. The Soviet Navy
lacks the more sophisticated logistics train which has been
developed by the United States Navy. Specifically designed
logistics ships have not been common to the soviet navy, and
consequently naval ships counted heavily upon the availability
of merchant hulls for fuel and provisions anytime extended
operations were conducted.
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The merchant marine is a valuable ancillary arm of the
fighting fleet.
PART VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Some· countries have been inclined by nature toward the
sea; others by necessity. England, an island state with a
vast empire had no other choice. The Russians, however,
have never been compelled to go to sea. Up until now it has
strictly been a matter of choice. The fortunes of the
Soviet merchant marine have fluctuated considerably during
the period of its existence. Its development has been
closely linked to Russian economic policy.
Despite some rather strong verbal support from Soviet
officials in the early years of the regime, the commercial
fleet did not receive the actual support or attention needed
to become a first rate maritime institution. Nor would it
then have necessarily been wise for the Soviets to expend
scarce resources on it. The eaonomy was in a precarious
position helped not in the least by the attitude of many
foreign governments toward the Marxist regime. At that time
a merchant marine could hardly have stood high on the list
of useful instruments with which to counter the political
isolation by the West o£ the Bolshevik government.
As the Reds became firmly established and as restric-
tions on Western relations with the Soviet Union became less
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and less severe, the Soviets began to modernize and expand
their seaborne transportation on a small scale. They had no
requirement at that time for a major merchant fleet. In-
ternal waterways were considerably more important than an
ocean going fleet.
The conclusion of the Second World War left only two or
three countries which could be classed as great powers.
Russia was one. Soviet policy clearly came in conflict with
the West, particularly the United States as the War ended.
With the increase in tension, potential for actual hostili-
ties and the descent of the Iron Curtain, the Russians could
ill-afford to build a "peaceful" merchant marine. Their
efforts were concentrated on naval construction. It was a
rational decision and under circumstances as they perceived
them, very appropriate.
Stalin was an isolationist economically. He was con-
fident that the Marxist countries would be self-sustaining
without the need to deal with the capitalistic West. He was
therefore content at the time to concentrate on power re-
lationships within a rather well defined sphere of Russian
influence.
Soviet leadership following Stalin took a much broader
view of Communist power. They expanded into the fields of
aid, trade, and assistance. In this program a large merchant
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marine was an asset, almost an indispensable asset. In the
mid to late 1950's a vigorous merchant marine expansion
program began to take shape. Not only did the Soviets
become pro£icient in fleet operations, but also in ship
design and construction. Soviet trade became wide spread
and ships of the USSR literally sailed the Seven Seas.
Based on the development and operation of the Soviet
merchant marine several conclusions can be drawn directly
while others must be inferred, because of lack of access to
reliable information. Probably one of the safest con-
clusions which can be reached is that the Russians who
industrially were notably inept for years prior to World War
II and who historically had no lasting success with sea-
going ventures, have now made a major accomplishment in the
form of its commercial fleet. The present merchant navy is
composed largely of modern, relatively new, and often
automated ships.
The merchant marine represents a large capital investi-
ment which even a communist system cannot allow to be non-
productive. Therefore the fleet must be used to pay its own
way either economically or politically or both. The Soviets
do use it to earn convertible currency, to reduce currency
outflow, and to achieve independence from non-national
shipping. Economically the fleet is cost effective and has
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been a paying proposition. If it were not even the Soviets
could not have supported its development on the current
scale.
Missions other than economic ones are also carried out
by the merohant marine. There are situations in which a
naval presence is clearly inappropriate, but in which the
use of merchant shipping is valuable. Soviet commercial
relations with many African and Third World cQuntries fall
into this category. Obviously the presence of Soviet mer-
chant ships in Haiphong harbor during the Viet Narn war had
much less effect on intensifying the situation than would
have a Soviet missile cruiser.
Non-communist circles have expressed concern that the
Soviets have launched an economic offensive in which they
intend to overwhelm western commerce partially through
seaborne trade carried in Russian ships. Some critics of
Western inaction ascribe the Soviet build-up to ideological
motives. There may well be some truth in both assertions.
However, due consideration should be given to the fact that
Russia, a country with rich natural resources, is maturing
industrially and economically. Foreign trade is important
and valuable to further development. Under these conditions
it does not seem incongruous for a major nation to provide
its own means of seaborne transport.
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The Russian merchant marine is large. However, in the
aggregate it probably is no match for the combined resources
available to Western Europe, the United States, and Far
Eastern states such as Japan. One important fact to remem-
ber is that Communist ships fly the controlling countries
flag. The Soviet Union specifically prohibits use of "flags
of convenience". Not so with mqny non-communist states.
Who owns and controls all of the tonnage registered in
Panama and Biberia?
All things considered the Soviets have done an admirable
job of building a merchant marine in a remarkable short
time. It is a fleet to watch.
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